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A R T I C L E S
New England Classical Journal 44.4 (2017) 228-246
Caesar and Labienus: 
A Reevaluation of Caesar’s Most Important 
Relationship in De Bello Gallico
Gregory P. Stringer 
Burlington (MA) High School
e  f
Titus Labienus served with distinction under Caesar for the entirety of the future 
dictator’s 9 year governorship of Gaul. Labienus was indispensable to Caesar’s suc-
cess in Gaul. However, for reasons that can no longer be fully uncovered or under-
stood, when civil war broke out between Caesar and Pompey in 49 BCE, Labienus 
sided with the latter against his former commander.1 While scholars for more than a 
century have primarily focused on attempting to solve this intriguing question, La-
bienus can also serve as an interesting case study for approaching various questions 
about the work of literature that is, ultimately, our best source for knowledge of the 
man—Julius Caesar’s so-called De Bello Gallico.2
For this study, I have chosen to largely ignore questions of Labienus’ previous or 
subsequent political allegiance and, for the most part, other external ancient sources. 
1  This has been the primary topic of interest about Labienus for scholars, receiving several dedicated 
studies in the first half of the 20th century, but relatively little interest lately. The most recent extended 
treatment of this topic remains Tyrrell (1972). Timeless and important is Syme (1938).
2  Although we do not know what Caesar actually called his works, most modern scholars are content 
to refer to this one by the designations De Bello Gallico, Bellum Gallicum or Gallic Wars. I have chosen 
to stick to either De Bello Gallico or Gallic Wars. On the topic of the traditional names of the works, see 
Kelsey (1905).
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Instead, I focus primarily on what Caesar wrote in order to shed light on what was, 
ultimately, Caesar’s most important military relationship in Gaul. In fact, the result 
of a close analysis of the phrasing, vocabulary and rhetoric used by Caesar when 
describing the actions of Titus Labienus, as well as what he included versus what he 
left out, has uncovered a relationship between the imperator and his chief lieutenant 
that was much more complex and variable than heretofore believed. By retracing 
the appearances of Labienus in the text of De Bello Gallico and the language Caesar 
uses both to address the man and describe his actions, a more accurate portrait of a 
volatile relationship emerges, one marked by cycles of estrangement and rapproche-
ment, leading up to the final break in 49 BCE.
R H E T O R I C  I N  D E  B E L L O  G A L L I C O
Any reading of Caesar’s Comentarii must address some fundamental questions 
about composition and authorial intent.  In recent decades, the identification and 
explication of the subtextual rhetoric of Caesar’s seemingly direct prose has become 
one of the main preoccupations of Commentarii scholarship and has shown that 
Caesar’s Latin is not so “plain” or “straightforward” as once believed.3  Therefore, 
before an analysis of the specific episodes involving Labienus, we will look at some 
of the main questions of the text in which consensus has, and has not, been reached.
Perhaps the most notable, and now universally recognized potentially insidi-
ous aspect of both the Gallic War and the Civil War is the author’s consistent use of 
the third person. Caesar seemingly adopted the practice from Xenophon’s Anabasis 
with the purpose of, in the words of Kenney, “giv[ing] an air of objectivity to what 
is a personal, autobiographical account.”4 However, Conte has seen the same feature 
rather as a tactic of “emotional detachment.”5 It may, indeed, be both. As this relates 
to Labienus, as will be seen, the third person narrator allows Caesar the author to 
put some interesting commentary about Caesar the commander in the mouth of his 
3  E.g. see the comments of Gardner:  “the Gallic Wars is perhaps not altogether a straightforward 
account of events.” (1983a, p. 25).
4  Kenney (1983, p. 283).
5  Conte (2004, p. 227). It is also interesting to note that the use of the third person led some earlier 
readers to believe that the texts had been written by Suetonius, not Caesar. Likewise, evidently because it 
is such a well known feature of the work, neither the editor of the Loeb nor the Penguin edition felt the 
third person narration even worthy of comment.
— 230 —
lieutenant.6
Rhetoric in Caesar, however, goes far beyond the choice of narrator. In a 1956 
paper Siedler identified no less than sixteen different rhetorical devices at play in 
Caesar’s writings, including multiple and striking instances of alliteration, asso-
nance, verbal symmetry, anaphora, asyndeton, and dramatic ellipsis, among others.7 
This was followed by Rasmussen’s important if flawed 1963 study, Caesars comentarii 
- Stil und Stilwandel am Beispiel der direkten Rede, which focused on the use of rhet-
oric in the oratio recta of Caesar’s works.8 While Rasmussen succeeded in demon-
strating that direct speeches were not later interpolations into the text, his attempt to 
use this discovery to prove synchronous composition falls flat.
A landmark in the study of rhetoric in Caesar was Rambaud’s L’Art de la Dé-
formation Historique.9 As the title implies, Rambaud operates under the assumption 
that Caesar’s works are entirely and intentionally distorted. Rambaud therefore in-
terprets Caesar’s every word about Labienus as an attempt to belittle or undermine 
his lieutenant’s achievements so as not to interfere with the aggrandizement of his 
own deeds. Shortly after that followed Tyrrell’s doctoral thesis, which collected all 
known relevant information about Labienus.10 Unlike Rambaud, Tyrrell was reluc-
tant to read into what is written in De Bello Gallico and generally reported whatever 
Caesar had written without scrutiny. 
In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, the study of Caesar largely turned to the decon-
struction of various themes in his work. In a 1977 article, Murphy illustrated several 
textual themes he had detected through each of the books of the De Bello Gallico via 
the striking repetition of key vocabulary, such as “persuasio” and “timor” in Book 
I, “perturbatio” in Book IV or “celeritas” in Book VI.11 In her introduction to the 
reprinted Penguin edition of The Conquest of Gaul [i.e. De Bello Gallico], Gardner 
introduced the thematic concepts of the “German menace” and “Gallic menace.”12 
Gardner expanded on these ideas in a 1983 follow-up paper in which she argued 
that the central, guiding principle of the De Bello Gallico was, through a portrayal of 
6  On Labienus’ speech and its rhetorical significance, see below.
7  Siedler (1956).
8  Rasmussen (1963).
9  Rambaud (1966).
10  Tyrrell (1970).
11  Murphy (1977, pp. 235, 238, and 240).
12  Gardner, (1983a, pp. 25-26).
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Caesar’s actions in Gaul in the light of reasonable reaction to foreign provocation, 
to provide Caesar with the political justification he needed to escape prosecution 
and secure his second consulship.13 In a 1998 study of Caesar’s lieutenants, Welch at-
tempted to balance earlier approaches to rhetoric in Caesar. While she did not refute 
the possibility of distortion, Welch believes that Caesar generally gave credit where 
credit was due, including to Labienus.14
In the succeeding years ever more detailed studies of Caesar’s language and 
themes have followed, examining the author’s use of specific words and construc-
tions or the import of particular episodes. In this vein, Batstone’s linguistic study of 
the use of etsi, which he called a “subtle and effective piece of rhetoric,” leant sup-
port to Gardner’s notion of the Gallic War as a work of political justification.15 More 
recently, scholars have become increasingly creative (and increasingly tendentious) 
in their attempts to better understand Caesar via linguist theory, such as Erickson’s 
unconvincing 2002 study of the sea battle with the Veneti via the lens of gendered 
language or Brown’s unpersuasive 2004 exploration of Caesar’s “superhuman ego” 
through a detailed analysis of the so-called “centurions contest” at De Bello Gallico 
Book V.44.16
A central and seemingly irresolvable issue lay at the center of many of these 
studies—the dates of composition and publication of the two works.17 While the 
dates for the De Bello Civili are, for obvious reasons, less in doubt and more cir-
cumscribed, those of the De Bello Gallico remain an open question, often leading 
to circular arguments.18 Some have proposed that internal contradictions and an 
evolution from “bare, unadorned style of the commentarius” towards one “that in-
creasingly allows the typical ornaments of historia” supports the notion of annalistic 
composition at the end of each campaigning season, while others have used essen-
tially the same evidence to assert that it was composed altogether in the winter of 
13  Gardner (1983b).
14  Welch cites Holmes’ assertion “Caesar gave all his lieutenants, and especially Labienus, full credit 
for their exploits” (1911, p. 230) but rightfully questions how we can know how much or how little credit 
he gave or how much they deserved (1998, p. 100).
15  Batstone (1990, pp. 348-360). See nn. 18-19 below.
16  Erickson (2002). Brown (2004).
17  Conte (2004, p. 227).
18  Many of them, including several of the studies cited above, reading essentially like this: “if we 
imagine that Bellum Gallicum was written/published in 52/51, then we can read in them Caesar’s self-jus-
tification to avoid prosecution and campaigning for the consulship, which thereby proves they were 
written in 52/51.”
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52/51 BCE, though perhaps from field notes gathered year by year.19 In the absence of 
further external evidence, scholars are left to hypothesize about the date and nature 
of the composition and publication based on close readings of the texts themselves.
So while the dates of composition remain controversial, there is now an almost 
universal consensus that the Commentaries contain, as Grant puts it, “a good deal 
of distortion, not so much of the actual historical facts…but of motives, impres-
sions and implications.”20 For example, it is difficult not to read Caesar’s preemptive 
strike against the Helvetii in Book I of the De Bello Gallico as largely the result of 
provocative actions on the part of the Roman proconsul, recast in his Commentary 
as defensive measures.21 Likewise, Book IV sections 20-38 give the strong impression 
of special pleading written ex post facto to explain both the motive for his aggressive 
first expedition to Britain and the reasons for its relative lack of success.22 However, 
justification is always useful and therefore one need not necessarily read either of 
these episodes as anticipatory defenses against potential accusations, as Gardner and 
others have claimed.
Regardless, even if inclined to a more literal reading of the texts, one should 
certainly be aware of the fact that, as one of the day’s leading speakers and a man 
of literary tastes, oratorical and literary rhetoric unquestionably informed Caesar’s 
themes, grammar, syntax, and vocabulary. For example, Nordling, Grillo, and others 
have amply demonstrated that one need not adhere to some of the more extreme 
positions, such as Rambaud’s, to recognize that the Commentaries, and especially the 
speeches imbedded within, are rich with rhetoric.23 As an important and successful 
politician, Caesar’s need for justification, for specific political goals or otherwise, 
19  The comments are those of Conte who falls firmly in the first camp (2004, p. 227). He continues, 
“The interpretation is unquestionably a forced one that regards the latter [BG] as written and published 
for the purpose of supporting Caesar’s candidacy for his second consulship,” ( 2004, p. 229) in opposi-
tion to the opinions of Gardner (1983a, p. 24; 1983b, pp. 188-189) and Rasmussen (1963).
20  Grant (1977, pp. 216-217).
21  For example, the forced march to the frontier, the requisitioning of troops throughout Provence, 
and the destruction of the bridge at Geneva (DBG I.7).
22 Justification for aggression: quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde sumministrata 
auxilia intellegebat, and explaining the relative lack of success: exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi 
in his locis … tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit… et, si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, 
tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adisset et genus hominum perspexisset, loca, 
protus, aditus cognovisset. See also the aforementioned article by Batstone about the rhetorical nature of 
etsi and tamen constructions in Caesar (1990, passim).
23  Nordling (1991); Grillo (2012).
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undoubtedly colored his writing. However, since there remains uncertainty as to 
when and how the Commentarii were composed and published, it would be unwise 
to give oneself over too easily to programmatic and dogmatic statements as to why 
they were published.
Therefore, although I am thoroughly indebted to the contributions of all of 
these scholars (and many others) for insight on how to read Caesar’s Commenta-
rii intelligently, upon close study of all of the passages which refer to Labienus in 
De Bello Gallico, I have found the few specific analyses of the relationship between 
Caesar and Labienus to be incomplete. For example, Tyrrell’s preoccupation with 
Labienus’ later career with Pompey, Rambaud’s unwavering commitment to reading 
everything Caesar wrote in the most negative light possible, and Welch’s attempt to 
generalize about Caesar’s relationships with his subordinates has led to an imperfect 
understanding of Labienus as he is presented in De Bello Gallico. In fact, scholars 
seem to operate under a notion that the relationship between the two men during 
Caesar’s proconsulship was essentially static.24 Rather, a close reading of the text 
suggests quite the opposite —a dynamic and changing interaction with noticeable 
variations in what Caesar asked of his lieutenant and even how he asked.
L A B I E N U S  I N  T H E  S O U R C E S ,  A N C I E N T  A N D  M O D E R N
As stated above, most of what we know about Titus Labienus has been collected by 
Tyrrell.25 The most salient facts for our purposes are that he was likely born about 
99 BCE, making him nearly an exact contemporary of Caesar and, having probably 
reached the praetorship in 60 or 59 BCE, he would have held imperium pro-praetore 
while in Gaul with Caesar and probably entertained reasonable hopes of one day 
achieving the consulship.26
24  In the secondary literature I reviewed, I uncovered no references to difficulties between the two 
men prior to Labienus’ departure. The statement of Welch is indicative: “We cannot assume from these 
narratives that Caesar had any inkling of Labienus’ future disaffection. The chief legate continued to be 
trusted until the very end. Caesar is consciously demonstrating to his Roman audience the amount of 
cooperation and loyalty which existed among the high command in Gaul.” (1998, pp. 99-100)
25  Tyrrell (1972).
26  Tyrrell (1970, p. 425). There remains some question about Labienus’ praetorship. Since Caesar only 
refers to Labienus with this title, I am prepared to accept the conjecture of others that Labienus had held 
one of the at least 8 unknown praetorships of either 61, 60, or 59 BC; for comparison, Caesar had been 
praetor in 62, meaning that if Caesar was indeed born in 100 and Labienus in 99, then Labienus had in 
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The most extensive information about Labienus comes from what Caesar wrote 
about him, both in De Bello Gallico and in De Bello Civile. However, the manner in 
which Caesar describes the man and his actions naturally differs markedly between 
the two works, since the second was composed after Labienus’ departure to Pompey 
in 49 BCE.27 Although all of Caesar’s lieutenants are confined to a pronounced sec-
ondary role, as we will see, Labienus is the only person apart from Caesar to ap-
pear in every book of the Commentarii and he is the Roman (other than Caesar) 
whose name appears most frequently. He is also the only one of Caesar’s officers who 
is given a further description beyond legatus (he is specifically designated legatus 
pro praetore) and the only one who is ever directly assigned a subordinate officer.28 
Furthermore, Caesar addresses Labienus, directly and indirectly, in ways reserved 
only for him and entrusts him with unique commands.29 The text of De Bello Gallico 
makes clear that Labienus was an important figure in (and even outside of) Caesar’s 
camp.
As to Labienus’ time in Gaul from sources other than Caesar, Labienus appears 
occasionally in the letters of Cicero, although almost entirely after his break from 
Caesar, in Plutarch’s biographies of Caesar and Pompey, and in the historians of 
Imperial times who, by and large, did little more than retrace the steps of Caesar.30 
Cicero makes frequent reference to Labienus’ abilities, but unfortunately adds no 
new details to his service record in Gaul. Writing much later, Plutarch calls Labienus 
“one of Caesar’s greatest friends” and, along with Appian, gives him a greater share of 
the credit for the victories over the Helvetii and the Germans in Book I than Caesar 
does.31 Finally, the later historians Dio, Orosius, and Frontinus add nothing that had 
not already appeared in Caesar, whereas Florus at one point inexplicably confuses 
fact been following a similar career trajectory as Caesar. On Labienus’ hopes for the consulship, see the 
extended discussion in Syme where he treats the issue with his customary confidence in the authority of 
his own assumptions (1938, pp. 113-125, especially pp. 121-123).
27  For a discussion of Labienus in De Bello Civile, see Tyrrell (1970, pp. 424-440).
28  Labienus is so designated at DBG I.21 and assigned a subordinate, Marcus Sempronius Rutilus, at 
DBG VII.90.
29  See below.
30  See, for example, Cicero Att. 7.13a.1 and Fam. 16.12.4; Suetonius, Divus Iulius.
31  On “greatest friend,” see Plutarch, Caesar 33. On Labienus’ share of the victories, see Plutarch, 
Caesar 18; Appian, Gall. 1.8. Tyrrell also rightly points out that Caesar in 58 BC is not the Caesar of later 
campaigns - his army and his officers were new to him and relatively untested so this may account for 
some of Caesar’s reliance of Labienus in Book I (1970, p.18).
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Labienus with Dolabella.32
As Tyrrell records, modern historical opinion of Labienus has generally been 
negative.33 Mommsen’s scathing criticism of the man, largely centered on his deci-
sion to support Pompey over Caesar in the civil war, set a precedent which has never 
been fully overturned.34 Syme was more measured, arguing that Labienus was most 
likely returning to an allegiance with Pompey that predated his friendship with Cae-
sar, whereas Tyrrell prefered to interpret that Labienus, although somewhat embit-
tered by slighted ambition, merely “joined the legitimate government in its struggle 
against a revolutionary proconsul who placed his own dignitas above his country.”35 
Welch declined to comment on Labienus’ motives, although she did note that “it 
is probable that Caesar felt his generosity as an author as well as his patronage as a 
general had been betrayed dreadfully when Labienus deserted him for Pompey in 
49.”36 It would seem that this estimation, of disenchantment resulting from ambition 
stunted by Caesar, still prevails today.37
L A B I E N U S  I N  D E  B E L L O  G A L L I C O
So leaving aside his posterior decision to fight with Pompey, who is Titus Labienus 
in the pages of De Bello Gallico? First, as stated above, he is clearly distinguished 
from any of Julius Caesar’s other subordinates in terms of the number of references 
and the amount of text dedicated to him. Second, Labienus’ commands are unique 
for their size, type, and importance. And finally, he is differentiated by the actual 
words and phrases which Caesar uses to describe him. We will look at each of these 
three elements in turn.
Labienus is, after the imperator himself, the Roman who appears most frequent-
ly in the seven books of De Bello Gallico ascribed to Julius Caesar, referenced by 
32  Florus I.45.
33  Tyrrell (1972, p. 439). Holmes stands somewhat apart - among many other laudatory statements he 
concludes that “the genius of Labienus has not been adequately appreciated.” (1911, p. 161). However, he 
also felt that Caesar had recognized his services: “but it needs little insight to see that Caesar placed him 
in a class by himself ” and that, nevertheless, “Caesar’s was the directing mind.” (1911, pp. 161-162).
34  Mommsen (1958, p. 392).
35  Syme (1938, pp. 113-125); Tyrrell (1972, p. 439).
36  Welch (1998, pp. 100-101).
37  See, for example, Goldsworthy (2006, p. 383).
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name a full 51 times, on 45 distinct occasions, and referred to obliquely in a handful 
of other places.38 These references are somewhat unevenly distributed, as Labienus 
appears seven times in Book I, but then virtually disappears until Books V, VI, and 
VII, in which he is named 15, 9, and 14 times, respectively. Despite being less prom-
inent in Books II, III, and IV, he nevertheless remains the only legate mentioned in 
all seven books. For comparison, the next most frequently named legati are Quintus 
Tullius Cicero and Quintus Titurius Sabinus, who appear about half as much, on 23 
and 20 occasions respectively. Cicero only appears from Book V on and Sabinus is 
absent from Book I and killed in dramatic fashion in Book V.39 Moreover, the vast 
majority of the references to Cicero (20 of 23) occur in Book V, scene of his dramatic 
hold-out and eventual rescue by Caesar and all but two of the mentions of Sabinus 
occur during his two prolonged adventures in Books III and V.
Caesar further distinguishes Labienus in De Bello Gallico by the commands 
with which he was entrusted, in terms of their nature, size, and importance. Where-
as, at least from what Caesar shares with us, rarely are the other legati given anything 
more than the responsibility of a single legion’s winter camp, Labienus was on sev-
eral occasions put at the head of multiple legions, such as when he commands the 
united winter camp of all the legions after the first season’s campaigns in Book I or 
when Caesar has him lead four legions against the Parisii and Senones in Book VII.40 
Likewise, Labienus is one of only a few soldiers sent on independent missions and 
is the only legate which Caesar ever specifically instructs to “make plans as he sees 
fit.”41 Finally, the importance of Labienus’ commissions is generally of the highest 
order, although this does seem to vary over the course of the war, as will be discussed 
below.
As noted previously, while Labienus is the most consistently appearing actor in 
the Gallic Wars other than Caesar, he nevertheless nearly disappears for long stretch-
38  Labienus is referenced by name at DBG Book I.10, 21, 22, 54; II.1, 11, 26; III.11; IV.38; V.8, 11, 23, 24, 
27, 37, 46, 47, 48, 53, 56, 57, 58; VI.5, 6, 7, 8, 33; VII.34, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 86, 87, 90.
39  Cicero first appears at V.24 and Sabinus dies at V.53.
40  In charge of the winter camp, I.54; against the Parisii and Senones, VII.34. While Dio (41.4.3) 
obviously over-generalizing from Book I that Labienus always was in command of all the legions when 
Caesar was gone at the end of the campaigning season, Caesar explicitly tells us otherwise at the end of 
each book. Tyrrell suggests that Caesar did not repeat this experiment after the first year for fear of the 
familiarity and affection it would have perhaps allowed between Labienus and Caesar’s legions (1970, pp. 
22-23).
41  Labienus is instructed to consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet at V.8.
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es of the work. For example, after his aforementioned important contributions in 
Book I, Labienus is almost wholly absent from Books II, III, and IV, despite, accord-
ing to Tyrrell and others, having made important contributions to the war with Bel-
gae (the subject of Book II) and the overall heightened presence of Caesar’s legates in 
Book III, as illustrated by Welch.42 At the opening of Book III Caesar sends (mittit) 
Labienus to the Rhine with only some cavalry in order that he prevent (prohibeat) 
the Germans from crossing.43 Tyrrell suspected, and I agree, that this assignment 
hints at a demotion, as these types of assignments were typically reserved for the 
youngest officers.44 Although we do not know how serious the German threat at that 
moment really was, it is difficult to see how Labienus, with only a small detachment 
of cavalry, could have truly kept them in check if they indeed attempted to cross in 
force.45 Caesar did not record the result, so we can only imagine that Labienus was 
successful in preventing a German incursion. If so, perhaps it was because the threat 
never actually materialized or had not really existed in the first place.
After being sent to the Rhine at the beginning of Book III, Labienus again goes 
missing from the text until the final paragraph of Book IV when he is once again 
entrusted with multiple legions to subdue the Morini.46 If there had been a falling 
out between Caesar and his lieutenant, it evidently had been resolved by this time. 
Caesar reports that Labienus was successful, but he does so with a caveat of the type 
that Rambaud feels is indicative of Caesar’s belittling of his subordinates and, in this 
particular case, explaining away his own failure to conquer the same people in the 
preceding year’s campaign: “The enemy had no place of retreat, by reason of the 
dryness of the marshes, their refuge in the previous year.”47 Or, in other words, yes, 
Labienus won, but so would have Caesar, had it not been for the weather.
42  Welch (1998, pp. 91-94).
43  DBG III.11.
44  Tyrrell (1970, pp. 21-22). Cf. DBG I.52 in which Publius Crassus is sent with a detachment of 
cavalry and he is explicitly described by Caesar as adulescens: Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus ad-
ulescens, qui equitatui praeerat, quod expeditior erat quam ii qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem 
laborantibus nostris subsidio misit. Publius Crassus was born somewhere between 86-82 BCE, making 
him between 23 and 28 at that time. Labienus, on the other hand would have about 41 or 42 years old, or 
consular age, and had almost certainly held the praetorship.
45  Tyrrell (1970, pp. 21-22).
46  DBG IV.38.
47  DBG IV.38. Rambaud (1966, p. 297). Tyrrell (1970, p. 29) disagrees.
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The relationship still shows evidence of strain at the opening of Book V. Al-
though Caesar once again decides not to take Labienus with him to Britain, which in 
and of itself is perhaps noteworthy, he does leave an important commission for his 
marshal—to defend the ports and acquire grain for the armies.48 It is also significant 
that Caesar entrusts Labienus to “make plans as suiting the moment and the situa-
tion,” a phrase that Caesar does not use elsewhere for any other legate and is perhaps 
indicative of a greater level of trust in Labienus’ independent military judgement.49 
Furthermore, when Caesar needs ships to return to the continent he “writes to La-
bienus” (Labieno scribit) that he build as many ships as he can.50 There are only two 
other occasions on which Caesar uses the verb scribere in reference to his commu-
nication with one of his legates, instead of the his more usual iubere or mittere - to 
Labienus, as will be discussed below, and to Quintus Cicero, where Caesar is not 
giving orders to his legate, but is instead encouraging him to maintain his valor until 
help arrives.51 It is significant that Caesar reserves this more polite tone of conveying 
his wishes only for Labienus.52
Caesar was disappointed in his rediscovered trust in Labienus. Most of the re-
quested fleet never arrived and Caesar does not hide his displeasure upon not re-
ceiving the ships: “for which Caesar waited in vain for quite some time.”53 The words 
aliquamdiu and frustra carry a distinct negative thrust. This is followed immediately 
by the re-division of winter assignments and whereas previously Caesar has always 
listed Labienus’ assignment first; here he is fourth, after Fabius, Cicero, and Roscius, 
and he is only given one legion to command.54 It is hard to imagine that these slights 
48  DBG V.8.
49  Ibid. consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet.
50  DBG V.11: Labieno scribit, ut quam plurimas posset eis legionibus, quae sunt apud eum, naves 
instituat.
51  DBG V.48: In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum celeiter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam vir-
tutem retineat.
52  Caesar most commonly refers his orders to his legates via the verb “iubere”: thrice to Labienus 
(II.11, VI.33, VII.90), thrice to Publius Crassus (III.9, III.11, V.46) and once each to Sabinus (II.5), Deci-
mus Brutus (III.11), Publicus Sulpicius Rufus (IV.22), and Lucius Plancus (V.25) and once in reference to 
all his gathered legates (V.24). In contrast, although he often refers to himself as imperator, the verb the 
verb “imperare” is almost exclusively used for the Gauls, hostages, or Gallic towns, or occasionally the 
Roman troops en masse. In fact, Caesar never uses it toward Labienus but does use it twice to named 
Roman subordinates (Crassus at III.26 and Gaius Fabius at V.47).
53  DBG V.23: Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra exspectasset.
54  DBG V.24.
— 239 —
are incidental.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Labienus was Caesar’s best general and Cae-
sar often relied on his abilities. The later events of Book V bring this into stark relief 
and Labienus returns spectacularly to prominence after the long tale of Sabinus’ de-
mise. That said, although Caesar undoubtedly highlights some of Labienus’ achieve-
ments here, the narrative is not without internal tension. As he begins to make plans 
to relieve Quintus Cicero’s besieged camp, Caesar “writes” to Labienus that he come 
“if he could do so in a way that was of advantage to the state.”55 This is the same 
phrase that Caesar reports that the Senate had used in their request to him in Book 
I and that Caesar himself will use again when encouraging (hortatur) Labienus and 
Trebonius to return to him to make new plans in Book VI.56 Labienus writes back 
that he is unable to return safely, one of only two occasions on which a legate dis-
obeys Caesar’s orders and the only occasion on which it did not result in disaster.57 In 
hindsight, the qualifying phrase of “only if … it was of advantage to the state” Caesar 
attaches to his command may be some Monday morning quarterbacking, either to 
cover for an error in Caesar’s judgement or at least to make Labienus’ direct refusal 
of Caesar’s orders less obvious.
Caesar essentially confirms this in the following paragraph which he begins 
with the words “Caesar approved of his plan,” but he is then quick to point out that 
it is the news of his own victory which forces the Treveri to retreat and makes it safe 
for Labienus to move again.58 This in particular seems to be an obvious interpretative 
interjection by Caesar, as it is utterly unclear how Caesar the man (as opposed to 
Caesar the omniscient narrator) could have possibly known of Indutiomarus’ abort-
ed plans to attack Labienus’ camp on the following day (if indeed he had such a plan) 
or that news of Caesar’s victory forced him to retreat, especially since the chieftain 
was killed in battle, presumably taking any battle plans and motivations with him to 
55  DBG V.46: Scribit Labieno, si rei publicae commodo facere posset, cum legion ad fines Nerviorum 
veniat.
56  Senate to Caesar, I.35: si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus sena-
tus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, 
Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum. Caesar to 
Labienus and Trebonius, VI.33: Labienum Treboniumque hortatur, si rei publicae commodo facere possint, 
ad eum diem revertantur, ut rursus communicato consilio exploatisque hostium rationibus aliud initium 
belli capere possint.
57  DBG V.47. Cf. the results of Sabinus’ disobedience in Book V.
58  Caesar approves: consilio eius probato… (DBG V.48). Caesar’s victory occupies the next 4 chapters 
(DBG V.48-52) and news of it reaches Labienus at V.53.
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the grave.59
Be that as it may, it is worth noting that Labienus again displays a freedom of 
will denied to Caesar’s other legates when, of his own auspices, he requisitioned 
more cavalry and launched a successful counter-strike. It is here that Caesar injects 
the infamous phrase “fortune supported the man’s [Labienus’] plan” (comprobat 
hominis consilium fortuna) which Rambaud saw as particularly derisive.60 We are 
not obligated to read it as such; Caesar, like Sulla Felix before him, recognized the 
importance of good luck.61 Welch argues that that particular phrase is nothing more 
than a commonplace of Caesarian commentaries, but conjectures that Caesar was 
nevertheless equally able to diminish the impact of Labienus’ victory by splitting the 
account of it over two books.62
Perhaps more indicative is how Caesar chose to end Book V: “And after this was 
done, Caesar found Gaul a little bit quieter,” (pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar 
quietiorem Galliam).63 Therefore, directly after the lengthy account of Labienus’ suc-
cesses, the last three words in readers’ eyes or listeners’ ears would have been “Caesar 
quietiorem Galliam.” This cannot be accidental and the choice of a sentence, with 
Caesar as the subject and with this specific word order, seem intended to confound 
as to who is the doer of these deeds and nevertheless to remind all as to who is ulti-
mately the subject and the star of these commentaries.
As Welch had already pointed out, at the beginning of Book VI Caesar picks 
up what is in fact the second part of Labienus’ same campaign in 53 BC.64 Labienus 
is still apparently acting largely of his own initiative, but Caesar halts the account to 
insert a speech in direct discourse (oratio recta), one of only two given to a legate 
and the only one that is positive in tone and outcome.65 It is in this oration that Cae-
59  DBG V.58.
60  DBG V.57. Rambaud (1966, p. 298).
61  See the discussion of fortuna in Grant where he cites Lucan, Pharsalia I.148-149 and De Bello 
Africano 10 (1974, p. 18). Similarly, Cicero discusses the importance of felicitas to a good commander at 
Leg. Man. 47-48.
62  Welch (1998, pp. 98-99).
63  DBG V.58.
64  Welch (1998, pp. 98-99).
65  The other speech in the mouth of legate is that of Sabinus at V.30 and can hardly be considered 
flattering. In it, Sabinus’ pouts and attempts to deflect blame for the coming defeat and slaughter onto 
his associate Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta. Caesar, not surprisingly, is nowhere to be seen in this speech. 
For more on speeches in Caesar, see Dalström (2015).
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sar puts into Labienus’ mouth a reminder that they are fighting for Caesar: “display 
under our command the same valor that you have often displayed in the presence of 
the imperator.”66 As others have discussed, whether or not Labienus ever said words 
to this effect is unlikely and unknowable, yet the presence of almost the exact same 
exhortation by Labienus in indirect discourse (oratio obliqua) later in Book VII 
certainly makes it suspect.67 Nevertheless, by the presence of this speech, Labienus 
clearly had been restored to a leading place among Caesar’s legates. The next time 
Caesar addresses him, he is again in command of multiple legions and Caesar ex-
horts (hortatur) him, along with Trebonius, also sent with three legions, to return 
in seven days so that they can formulate upcoming strategy. This command is again 
qualified by the statement si rei publicae commodo facere possint.68 
Toward the end of the campaigns in Gaul, Caesar occasionally placed his new-
est legate, Gaius Trebonius, on seemingly equal footing with Labienus.69 Yet it is 
worth noting some subtle differences in the commands they received. Trebonius did 
in fact twice receive command of three legions, at V.17 to gather food for the legions, 
and at VI.33 to ravage the lands of the already defeated Atuatuci.70 However, only 
Labienus ever gets more than three legions, and the magnitude of his missions - in-
dependent attacks against the Menapii (VI.33) and the upcoming decisive campaign 
against the Parisii (VII.34, 57) - clearly distinguishes these commands from those of 
Trebonius. Finally, on both of the occasions in which Trebonius had command of 
three legions, Labienus was also in command of three or more legions. Therefore, 
although Trebonius clearly received Caesar’s favor in the later years of the Gallic 
campaigns, he never quite eclipsed Labienus’ importance in the camp.
In fact, when Labienus returns midway through Book VII, Caesar sends him 
against the Senones and the Parisii with four legions plus cavalry, the biggest single 
force ever entrusted to a subordinate in the De Bello Gallico.71 Caesar’s praise of La-
66  DBG VI.8: praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, 
atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate.
67  Cf. DBG VII.62: Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proelio-
rum memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse 
existimarent.
68  DBG VI.33.
69  Trebonius joined Caesar in Gaul in 54 BCE, following his loyal service to the triumvirs during his 
tribunate of 55.
70  Caesar had already crushed the Atuatuci at their fort in Belgium in 57 BCE (DBG II.33).
71  DBG VII.34. Other legates had been given command of three legions on other occasions. Gaius 
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bienus actions at Lutetia seems authentic, although he seems to undercut some of 
the lieutenant’s victory, once again inserting himself into the narrative via a speech 
attributed to Labienus.72 On this occasion it is delivered in indirect discourse and 
although the phrasing has changed slightly, the words and meaning are nearly iden-
tical: “And remember Caesar himself, in whose presence you have often conquered 
enemies and imagine that he is present.”73 Following the speech Labienus fades to 
the background of Caesar’s prose and it is the troops and the lesser tribunes who 
carry out all the actions and receive all the credit win the day: “when the tribunes of 
the Seventh Legion were told what was afoot on the left wing, they brought out their 
legion in the rear of the enemy and attacked.”74
The final two acts of Labienus in Caesar’s portion of the Gallic Wars confirm his 
high standing which in turn has led to the endless speculation as to why he would 
have broken with Caesar in 49. However, Caesar’s reporting of these events exhibits 
his same tendency to steal the scene. At the final battle at Alesia, Labienus intervenes 
at a crucial moment and even offers tactical advice to Caesar, something unparal-
leled in all of the De Bello Gallico, but Caesar immediately whisks the audience back 
to himself who “speeds on so that he can be in the battle.”75 If that was not enough, 
Caesar punctuates the change of focus in dramatic fashion in very next line: “his 
[Caesar’s] arrival was known from the color of his cloak, which he was accustomed 
Trebonius received command of three legions twice: to gather food for the legions (V.17) and to ravage 
the lands (VI.33) of the already defeated (DBG II.33) Autatuci. Only Labienus ever gets more than three, 
and the magnitude of his missions - independent attacks against the Menapii (VI.33) and the Parisii 
(VII.34, 57) - clearly distinguishes these commands from those of Trebonius. Furthermore, on both 
occasions on which Trebonius has command of three legions, so does Labienus.
72  DBG VII.62.
73  Ibid. The preceding phrase ut suae pristinae virtutis … retinerent memoriam also echoes Caesar’s 
own words to his troops uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent at II.21, and Caesar’s earlier 
exhortation in a letter to Cicero ut pristinam virtutem retineat at V.48 (without an explicit mention of 
Caesar, perhaps since he is quoting from his own purported letter), and Labienus’ own words praestate 
eandem nobis ducibus virtutem at DBG VI.8. See above, n. 45. Furthermore, the phrase is attested in 
Sallust, Cataline 58 (memores pristinae vitutis), so we can imagine that it might have been something of 
a commonplace at the time.
74  DBG VII.62: cum septimae legionis tribunis esset nuntiatum quae in sinistro cornu gererentur, post 
tergum hostium legionem ostenderunt signaque intulerunt.
75  DBG VII.87: Labienus, postquam neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis 
una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidus deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiorem 
quid faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.
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to use in battles as an insignia.”76 The narrative is all Caesar, his common soldiers, 
and the Gauls from then on out.
Labienus appears one final time before the close of Book VII when he is ordered 
to the territory of the Sequani for the winter.77 He is again the first legate named and 
he even has a subordinate assigned—another unprecedented honor.78 Therefore, at 
the end of the Caesarian portion of De Bello Gallico, Labienus is back where he be-
gan, first among equals of the always secondary Caesarian legates.
As an epilogue, when Hirtius picks up the story of the following year in Book 
VIII, things have changed dramatically. Mark Antony is now the first legate named 
and Labienus is actually asked to send back one of his two legions.79 It is unclear how 
much of this is merely a shift in emphasis due to hindsight, since Hirtius wrote this 
appendix long after the events he recounts and certainly after Labienus had joined 
Pompey.80 Nevertheless, scholars have traditionally accepted the general truth of 
what Hirtius recorded regarding the movement of Caesar’s armies in Gaul and there-
fore, even if Caesar did eventually put Labienus in charge of the province, ordering 
the return of a legion seems to represent yet another dip in the constantly fluctuating 
relationship of the commander and his most able and successful lieutenant.81
In conclusion, although most scholarship on Labienus has focused on the in-
triguing question of why he left Caesar after such a successful career with him, these 
arguments have traditionally been based largely on the other contemporary or pos-
terior documents such as the letters of Cicero or successive histories. It now seems 
clear that Labienus’ departure from Caesar cannot simply be due to pre-existing 
allegiances to Pompey as Syme argued.82 Instead, a re-evaluation of their time to-
gether as revealed in the pages of De Bello Gallico exposes a relationship that was 
76  DBG VII.88: eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat.
77  DBG VII.90.
78  Ibid.: Titum Labienum duabus cum legionibus et equitatu in Sequanos proficisci iubet: huic Marcum 
Sempronium Rutilum attribuit.
79  Hirtius, DBG VIII.2, 6.
80  For the date of Hirtius’ composition, see especially the discussion in Holmes (1911, pp. 824-825).
81  Labienus in charge of the province, Hirtius (DBG VIII.52). This too, could be seen as an attempt 
to remove Labienus from the theater of action as to not allow him to share any credit for the ultimate 
victory and pacification of Gaul. Caesar undoubtedly remembered and was perhaps attempting to avoid 
a situation similar to that when Pompey had usurped some of Crassus’ glory for putting down the slave 
rebellion of Spartacus by swooping in and finishing off those detachments not defeated by Crassus in 
the main engagement in Lucania in 71 BCE.
82  Syme (1938).
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very complicated, with a an evident series of estrangements and reconciliations. 
While Labienus never openly broke with Caesar while in Gaul and he did, as others 
have said, “everything Caesar asked of him,” there are evident signs of tension in 
their relationship, visible even through the lens of Caesar’s writings, which make the 
rupture of 49 easier to understand. Therefore, scholars would do well to reconsider 
the tension between Caesar and Labienus and the mutable and sometimes volatile 
nature of their relationship revealed here as instructive when approaching larger 
questions about the nature of Caesar’s command in Gaul, his relationship with all his 
subordinate officers, the formation and dissolution of his alliances in the build up to 
the Rubicon, and even the degree of rhetorical distortion present in the Comentarii.
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